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Learning Recommendations While Influencing Interests
Rahul Meshram, D. Manjunath and Nikhil Karamchandani
Abstract—Personalized recommendation systems (RS) are
extensively used in many services. Many of these are based
on learning algorithms where the RS uses the recommendation
history and the user response to learn an optimal strategy.
Further, these algorithms are based on the assumption that
the user interests are rigid. Specifically, they do not account
for the effect of learning strategy on the evolution of the
user interests. In this paper we develop influence models for
a learning algorithm that is used to optimally recommend
websites to web users.
We adapt the model of [1] to include an item-dependent
reward to the RS from the suggestions that are accepted by the
user. For this we first develop a static optimization scheme when
all the parameters are known. Next we develop a stochastic
approximation based learning scheme for the RS to learn the
optimal strategy when the user profiles are not known. Finally,
we describe several user-influence models for the learning
algorithm and analyze their effect on the steady user interests
and on the steady state optimal strategy as compared to that
when the users are not influenced.
Index Terms—Recommendation systems; Learning algo-
rithms; Stochastic Approximation; Optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personalised recommendation systems (RS) are being used
in a large variety of situations, e.g., suggesting movies and
music on streaming services, YouTube videos, items to shop,
and news articles to read. Many of these are learning systems
that use the history of recommendations and user reactions
to determine the user interest profile and hence the sequence
of recommendations. An implicit assumption in the design
of these systems is that the user interests are ‘rigid,’ i.e.,
they are not influenced by the recommendation history. In
this paper, we analyze a recommendation system in which
while learning to recommend optimally, the learning process,
i.e., the sequence of recommendations, influences the user
interests which now evolve with time. We believe that this is
an important aspect of recommendation systems that needs
to be better understood.
Our starting point in this paper is the learning algorithm
described for a personalised RS in [1]. This RS considered a
system in which the objects are complex in that the liking of
the item depends on the random set of ‘sub-items’ that are
present when the item is shown. This in turn was motivated
by recommendations from the Stumbleupon website1. We
introduce some modifications to their system to model the
influence of the learning process on the user interests. This
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model is also convenient to develop a tractable influence
model, albeit a stylized one.
The system has a number of topics that may interest a
user at any time and there are a number of websites, each of
which cover only a subset of these topics at any time. A user
has an interest profile, unknown to the RS, that describes the
level of interest in each topic. A website is characterized
by the frequency with which each of topic is covered.
The RS makes a sequence of suggestions of websites till
the user chooses (‘likes’) one, i.e., the recommended site
has the topic of interest. The RS experiences a cost that
is increasing in the number of trials before a suggestion
is accepted. Our first key departure from the model of
[1] is in our assumption that the RS receives a website-
dependent reward from the site that the user likes. Thus the
RS has to use a recommendation strategy that maximizes
its payoff, i.e., reward minus cost. The reward skews the
recommendation sequence towards profitable websites and
motivates the modeling of the learning process influencing
the user interest towards topics that are covered by profitable
sites.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
consider the system in which the characteristics of both the
user and the websites are known and fixed, and the RS
needs to determine the optimal randomized recommendation
strategy. This is the subject of Section II. In Section III we
develop the learning algorithm and its analysis when the user
characterization is not available to the RS. The optimum
strategy is learnt through a binary feedback from the user
and is along the lines of [1] but modified for the new payoff
structure. In Section IV we describe models for the influence
of the recommendation sequence on the user’s interest and
then study the effect of the interaction between the learning
algorithm of the RS and the changing interest profile of the
user.
A. Literature Survey
The literature on recommendation systems in varied and
extensive. Personalised RS are typically based on a form of
collaborative filtering (suggest items that are preferred by
other ‘similar’ users), or are content-based (suggestions are
derived from history of user behavior), or a combination of
both. See [2], [3] for excellent surveys. Detailed descriptions
of personalized news recommendations are available in [1],
[4]–[8]. Collaborative filtering and the probabilistic cluster-
ing method is used in [4]. Online learning algorithms are
described in [1]. A hybrid filtering technique is considered in
[5] using a Bayesian learning model. Context-based filtering
techniques are used in [5], [7]. As we mentioned earlier, all
of these assume that the user interest is rigid and does not
evolve. In fact, the stability of user interest has been studied
in [5] via a large scale log analysis of Google News users.
User interest prediction are of interest in [5], [9]. But these do
not study, or model, the cause of the change of user interests.
In this work, we take a first step towards filling this gap.
II. MODEL, NOTATION, AND THE STATIC PROBLEM
Consider a RS that has a set of M websites. There are a
total of N topics that these websites can cover. Each website
will cover one or more of these topics. We will assume
that when website m is recommended, it will have covered
topic n with probability pm,n independent of everything else.
The row vector pm = [pm,1, . . . , pm,N ] will be called the
publishing strategy of website m. The matrix P = [[pm,n]]
will be called the publishing matrix.
∑N
n=1 pm,n is the
expected number of topics that are covered by website m
on any showing. Further,
∑
m pm,n is the expected number
of websites that cover topic n and we assume this to be
strictly positive, i.e., we assume that there is at least one
website that covers each topic n.
When a user begins its search for a website, we say that a
user session has begun. At the start of the session the user is
interested in topic n with probability θn and we assume that
this remains unchanged during the session. θ := [θn], a row
vector, will be called the interest profile of the user. Clearly,∑N
n=1 θn = 1. We assume that the RS uses a randomized
strategy and recommends website m independently of every-
thing else, with probability xm in each trial; x := [xm], a row
vector, is called the strategy of the RS; also
∑M
m=1 xm = 1.
The user can either accept the recommendation and click
through to the website. Or it can reject the recommendation
and ask for another recommendation and the RS obliges.
This continues till the recommendation is accepted by the
user at which point the session ends. Each recommendation
in a session will be called a trial. Clearly, the number of trials
in a session is random and depends on x, θ, and P. We will
assume that the recommendations in each trial of a session
are independent and drawn from the same distribution x.
For each click-through, website m offers a fixed revenue
rm to the RS. Let r := [rm], a row vector, be the revenue
vector. The user experience in a session depends on the
number of trials required to obtain a topic of interest; the
smaller the number of trials the better the user experience.
To capture this, we define a cost function for each session, cl
where l is the number of trials in the session. We will assume
that cl is convex and non decreasing in l. Associating such
a cost for each session ensures that RS does not recommend
too many low interest sites in a session even though they may
fetch a higher revenue. In the rest of this paper, we assume
that the cost function is polynomial in l, specifically, we let
cl = l
κ, for a finite κ. Thus the objective of the RS is to
devise a strategy x that maximises the net expected reward,
revenue minus the cost, in each session.
For a fixed, θ, x, r, and P, we now calculate the expected
revenue per session. Given that the user interest is topic n in a
session, let ρn denote the conditional probability of accepting
a recommendation in a trial. Clearly, this is given by
ρn :=
M∑
m=1
xmpm,n. (1)
Given that the interest is in topic n, the conditional proba-
bility that the session ends with a click-through to site m is
given by
xmpm,n∑M
m=1 xmpm,n
.
The expected reward from a session under a recommendation
strategy x, say R(x), is thus
R(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
M∑
m=1
rm
[
xmpm,n∑M
m1=1
xm1pm1,n
]
.
Rearranging the above, we obtain
R(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
[∑M
m=1 rmxmpm,n∑M
m1=1
xm1pm1,n
]
. (2)
Let T be the random variable denoting the number of trials
in a session. Given n, T has a geometric distribution with
parameter ρn. Thus
Pr (T = l) =
N∑
n=1
θnρn (1− ρn)
(l−1)
for l ≥ 1. The expected cost under a recommendation
strategy x, say C(x), in a session is
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
(
∞∑
l=1
cl ρn(1− ρn)
l−1
)
.
We assume that xm ≥ ǫ > 0, i.e., all websites are
recommended with a non zero probability. ǫ can be seen
to be a guarantee from the RS to the websites. Since∑M
m=1 pm,n > 0, and xm ≥ ǫ, we see that ρn is strictly
positive, i.e., ρn ≥ δ > 0. This ensures that the expected cost
C(x) in each session is finite. We can rewrite the expected
cost C(x) in the following way.
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
[
∞∑
l=1
∆cl(1− ρn)
(l−1)
]
(3)
where,
∆cl =
{
c1 if l = 1,
cl − cl−1 if l > 1.
(4)
Derivation of Eqn. (3) is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 1: C(x) is convex in x.
Proof: Proof is given Appendix B.
The expected reward per session is thus (R(x)− C(x))
and the optimal strategy, x∗, is the solution to the following
optimization problem.
maxx F (x) = R(x)− C(x)
s.t.
∑M
m=1 xm = 1,
xm ≥ ǫ for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
(P1)
Observe that R(x) is a convex combination of ratios of
linear functions of x. Thus (P1) is a fractional program [10],
[11] that is the sum of two terms—a convex function of
x and a sum-of-ratios term. In [11] it is shown that (P1)
is essentially NP-complete and an interior point method to
obtain an ǫ-optimal solution is described. Our interest here
is not in the efficient solution of (P1). Instead, it is on the
effect of the reward structure on the recommendations. We
study this via some numerical examples below.
A. Numerical Examples
We now present some numerical examples when P, θ, and
r are known to the RS. Since the objective is to illustrate, we
consider a small system with five websites and four topics,
i.e., M = 5, N = 4. We will use the following publishing
matrix in all the examples of the paper.
P =


0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.10 0.40 0.45 0.05
0.10 0.05 0.15 0.70
0.65 0.10 0.20 0.05

 .
The publishing matrix P is chosen to have some variations
in the coverage of topics. Specifically, websites 1 and 2
have equal coverage, website 3 covers topics 2 and 3
approximately equal and has negligible coverage of other
topics, websites 4 and 5 are more specialised in that they
cover, respectively, topics 4 and 1 with significantly higher
frequency than others.
Different examples will have different reward structures
for the RS. In the following, we determine the optimal
strategy x∗ by solving (P1) as a static optimization problem
in MATLAB. We also use ǫ = 0.01, and κ = 2.5, i.e.,
cl = l
2.5.
In the first example, we consider reward
r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and user profile
θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9]. Note that reward from website
4 is the highest compared to other websites and that
website covers topic 4 most frequently. Also, from θ,
note that the user interest is high for topic 4. The optimal
recommendation strategy x∗ and net revenue F (x∗) are
shown in Table I. As expected, site 4 is recommended most
frequently because it covers topic 4 that matches the user
interest.
TABLE I
FOR r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] AND θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9], WE
SEE THE EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION STRATEGY ON NET REVENUE.
Recommendation strategy Net revenue
F (x) = R(x) − C(x)
1 x∗ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.96, 0.01] 336.20
2 x∗ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.20, 0.76, 0.01] 337
3 x∗ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.25, 0.72, 0.01] 337
In the second example, we use r =
[400, 125, 150, 150, 100] and θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9].
After solving (P1), we obtain the recommendation strategy
x∗ = [0.96, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01] and the net revenue
F (x∗) = 305.33. We observe that the website 1 is the
highly recommended website compared to other websites.
We further note that the net revenue obtained in this example
is less than that of first example. This is because the highest
rewarding website 1 covers all topics with equal probability,
while the user interest is highly skewed toward topic 4.
In the next section we consider the case when the user
interest θ is unknown and we describe a learning algorithm
that learns the optimum recommendation strategy based on
the feedback from each session.
III. AN ONLINE LEARNING ALGORITHM
We now consider the case when the publishing matrix P
and the reward vector r are known but the user interest θ
is not known. The algorithms and the corresponding theory
that we develop here can be extended to the case when either
one of P or r or both are also unknown. Assuming this
knowledge simplifies the pedagogy.
Recall from the preceding section that in a session each
recommendation is a trial and the RS sequentially recom-
mends websites until the user accepts a recommendation;
the accepted site was the first one to show the topic that
was of interest to the user in that session. We assume that
information about the accepted website and the topic of
interest is available to the RS. Further, the number of trials
in the session is also known to the RS. Let x(s) be the
strategy at the beginning of session s, T (s) the number of
trials required to achieve a click-through, m(s) the accepted
website and n(s) the topic that achieved the click through
in the session. We reiterate that we have assumed that∑M
m=1 pm,n > 0 and xm(s) ≥ ǫ > 0 for all m, s, and
hence ρn ≥ δ > 0.
The learning algorithm is stochastic gradient based where
the actual gradient is not available to update the strategy;
instead a noisy version of the gradient is known after each
session based on the feedback from the user. The analysis
uses the stochastic approximation approach.
We first describe the intuition for adaptation of the rec-
ommendation strategy and then describe and analyze the
algorithm. For intuition, we look at the gradients of R(x)
and C(x) w.r.t. x. Taking partial derivative of R(x) and C(x)
w.r.t. xm from (2) and (3), and using the definition of ∆cl
from (4), we obtain the following.
∂R(x)
∂xm
=
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
ρn
[
rm −
M∑
k=1
xkpk,n
ρn
rk
]
,
∂C(x)
∂xm
= −
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
∞∑
l=1
l∆cl+1(1− ρn)
l−1. (5)
The details of the derivation of Eqn. (5) are given in
Appendix C.
Now consider session s in which the user has accepted
website m(s) and clicked on topic n(s). Observe from
Eqn. (5) that the term
∑M
k=1
xk(s)pk,n(s)
ρn(s)
rk is the conditional
expected reward given that the user has performed a click-
through on topic n(s).
The term
(
rm(s) −
∑M
k=1
xk(s)pk,n(s)
ρn(s)
rk
)
is the difference
between the reward that is obtained from website m and
the conditional expected reward given that the user accepted
site m(s) and topic n(s). Since m(s) and n(s) are random,
this term also represents random quantity. Further, since the
number of trials in a session is random, l∆cl+1 is also
random.
The above discussion motivates us to consider feedback
to the RS in the following form. Define
gm(s) :=
{
1
xm(s)
∆ if m(s) = m, and n(s) = n
0 otherwise.
(6)
∆ =
[
rm −
1
ρn(s)
M∑
k=1
rkxk(s)pk,n + T (s)∆cT (s)+1
]
Define G(s) := [g1(s), · · · , gM (s)] and use the following
update to the strategy at the beginning of session s+ 1.
x(s+ 1) = ΠDǫ [x(s) + a(s)G(s)]. (7)
Here, a(s) is the learning rate parameter that satisfies a(s)→
0 as s → ∞,
∑∞
s=1 a(s) = ∞, and
∑∞
s=1 a
2(s) < ∞, and
Dǫ =
{
x : x = [x1, · · · , xM ]
T ,
∑M
m=1 xm = 1, xm ≥ ǫ
}
,
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1
M
. ΠDǫ is the Euclidean projection and defined as
follows.
ΠDǫ [y] := arg min
x∈Dǫ
||y − x||2 x ∈ R
M .
We remark that the learning algorithm defined by Eqns. (6)
and (7) can be viewed as a projected stochastic gradient
algorithm.
We first want to show that the adaptation term G(s) is
a noisy version of the gradient of the objective function
F (x) := R(x)−C(x) and that the noise has zero mean and
bounded variance. To show this, we first prove that F(x)
is continuously differentiable and Lipschitz in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2: The objective function is F(x) = C(x)−R(x)
and F : Dǫ → R is continuously differentiable and Lipschitz.
i.e.,
∇F(x) = ∇R(x)−∇C(x),
where ∇F(x) =
[
∂F(x)
∂x1
, · · · , ∂F(x)
∂xM
]
, ∇R(x) =[
∂R(x)
∂x1
, · · · ∂R(x)
∂xM
]
, ∇C(x) =
[
∂C(x)
∂x1
, · · · ∂C(x)
∂xM
]
and
||F(x˜) − F(xˆ)|| ≤ L˜||x˜ − xˆ||, for all x˜, xˆ ∈ Dǫ, and L˜
is a Lipschitz constant.
Proof: See Appendix D
We are now ready to show that the update strategy G(s)
is a noisy version of the gradient where the noise is zero
mean with bounded variance.
Lemma 3: G(s) is a noisy version of gradient of F(x),
that is, G(s) = ∇F(x(s) + V (x(s)), where V (x(s)) is ran-
dom variable such that E[V (x(s))] = 0 and E[||V (x(s)||2] <
∞.
Proof: See Appendix F.
In Theorem 1 below, we show that the continuous inter-
polated process of update algorithm of (7) asymptotically
tracks the solution of the limiting o.d.e.
x˙(s) = ∇F(x(s)) + z. (8)
Here, z is an error due to projection.
Theorem 1: Let a(s) be non negative sequence such that
a(s)→ 0 as s→∞,
∑∞
s=1 a(s) =∞ and
∑∞
s=1(a(s))
2 <
∞. Then, the iterates x(s) generated by the update equation
(7) converges to x∗ almost surely. Here, x∗ ∈ B := {x :
∇F (x) + z = 0} is the set of all stationary points. Also,
lims→∞ F (x(s)) = F (x
∗).
Proof: We present a sketch of the proof. From Lem-
mas 2 and 3, we note that the the Algorithm (7) with
decreasing stepsizes a(s) satisfies the assumptions A1, A2,
A3 and A4 in [12, Chapter 2, Section 2.1]. This allows us
to construct a piecewise linear and continuous interpolated
process of iterate (7) and show that the interpolated process
tracks the solution of o.d.e. (8). Further, the solution of o.d.e.
converges to the limit point set of the o.d.e., i.e., to the set
of all stationary points, B = {x : ∇F (x) + z = 0}. Hence,
the Algorithm (7) converges to a stationary point in B. The
detailed proof is given in [12, Chapter 2, Chapter 5, Section
5.4], [13, Chapter 5, Section 5.2].
Remark 1: In general, for the learning algorithm to con-
verge to the solution of the o.d.e., the algorithm has to follow
the stability property, i.e., the algorithm should converge
to a bounded value. Often, in stochastic approximation
problems, the stability of the algorithm is assumed. But in
our problem, the stability issue of the iterates (7) is solved
by the projection operation onto to the bounded convex set
Dǫ. Hence we do not need to make any assumption about
the stability property of the algorithm.
We next study the convergence of the Algorithm (7) via
some numerical examples.
A. Numerical examples
We simulate an RS where websites are recommended
in session s using strategy x(s). We adapt x(s) at the
beginning of session s + 1 using Eqn. (7). We use a(s) =
0.01
(1+s2/3)
. The system is also randomly initialized, i.e., x(1)
is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
We use publishing matrix P from Section II-A.
In Fig. 1, we illustrate the convergence of Algorithm (7)
for the first example of Section II-A. We plot xm(s) for
website m for m = 4, 5. We notice in Fig. 1-a that x4(s)→
0.96 and x5(s)→ 0.01 as s increases. For this example, from
Table I, we know that x∗ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.96, 0.01].
Thus x4(s) → x
∗
4, x5(s) → x
∗
5. Similarly other xm(s) →
x∗m. Note that the convergence rate of xm(s) in this al-
gorithm is determined by stepsizes a(s). We also plot the
net revenue F (x(s)) as function of s in Fig 1-b. We notice
that F (x(s)) also converges to F (x∗). In Fig. 1-c, the error
function ||x(s)− x∗|| verses s is plotted. We observe that it
decreases very quickly.
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Fig. 1. Plot (a) illustrates the recommendation strategy xm(s) for website m verses session s. Plot (b) describes the objective function F verses session s.
In plot (c), we describe the error function ||x(s)−x∗|| as function of s. It is illustrated for r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9].
IV. ON RECOMMENDATIONS INFLUENCING USER
INTERESTS
In the preceding section we studied online learning for
users whose interest for topics is unknown but it is static. It
may be that a user’s intrinsic interest in the various topics is
influenced by the recommendations from the RS and hence
is dynamic. This changing of the user interest in turn also
affects the recommendation strategy of RS, i.e., there is an
interaction between x(s) of the RS and the θ(s) of the user.
In this paper we assume that the RS is learning assuming
that the user interests are static and it does not know that it
is influencing the user’s interests. Our interest in this section
is to model such an interaction and study its effects. As in
the previous section, here we also assume that P and r are
known to RS.
Recall that x(s) is updated at the beginning of session
s + 1 according to Eqns. (6) and (7). Since user interest is
changing, its value at the beginning of session s is denoted by
θ(s). Let χn(s) denote the random variable corresponding
to the number of times topic n is seen during session s.
To model the influence, we introduce the following two
parameters. ξn, 0 ≤ ξn ≤ 1, denotes the ‘intrinsic’ interest
in topic n, βn, βn ≥ 1, is the influence factor on topic n,
and vn(s) is the influence level in session s. We consider
two kinds of influence models and define vn(s) differently
for these types.
1) Type-A influence where the users are negatively influ-
enced by repeated showing of a topic and interest for
the topic decreases with increased showings. For such
a topic, the influence level from session s is modeled
as follows.
vn(s) = ξnβ
−χn(s)
n . (9)
2) Type-B influence where the user interest increases for
topics that are shown frequently. For a topic that is
influenced in this manner, the level from session s is
modeled as follows.
vn(s) = ξn(1− β
−χn(s)
n ). (10)
For both types of influence, βn = 1, corresponds to the
case when there is no influence. For a given user, different
topics could be influenced differently and we reiterate that
influence type is associated with the topic. The effect of
vn(s) on θ(s+ 1) is modeled as below.
wn(s) :=
vn(s)∑N
n=1 vn(s)
. (11)
Define w(s) := [w1(s), · · · , wN (s)] and let b(s) be the
influence rate; this is similar to the learning parameter a(s) of
the previous section and satisfies here, b(s)→ 0 as s→∞,∑∞
s=1 b(s) = ∞, and
∑∞
s=1 b
2(s) < ∞. The influence of
χn(s) on the user interest θ(s+ 1) is modeled as follows.
θ(s+ 1) = (1− b(s))θ(s) + b(s)w(s). (12)
Recall that the recommendation strategy x(s) is also adapting
using Eqn. (7), where a(s) is adaptation parameter for RS.
The evolution of x(s) and θ(s) is of interest to us here and
we would like to analyze the asymptotic behaviour of x(s)
and θ(s) as s → ∞. The relation between the timescales
at which x(s) and θ(s) change determines the asymptotics
and the relative timescales can be modeled by having a(s)
and b(s) go to 0 at different rates. For example, if b(s)→ 0
much faster than a(s) then this models θ(s) changing at a
slower timescale than x(s). The exact opposite of can also
be modeled. Finally, we could also have both these change
at the same rate and this is modeled with a(s) = b(s).
The convergence analysis of θ(s) and x(s) for different
combinations of the relative timescales over which they
change is given in Appendix G. The analysis is based on
the two timescale stochastic approximation approach and the
technique is detailed in [12, Chapter 6].
A. Numerical Examples
We use the following parameter values. r =
[150, 125, 150, 400, 100], the initial user interest
θ(1) = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25], initial strategy
x(1) = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2], user characteristics for
topics ξ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9], and β = [3, 3, 3, 3].
In Fig. IV-A, we show an example for the type-B influence
model when x(s) adapts slower than θ(s), i.e., b(s)
a(s) →
∞. Specifically, a(s) = 0.11+s and b(s) =
0.5
1+s0.6 . We
observe that x(s) → x˜, θ(s) → θ˜ and F (x(s), θ(s)) →
F (x˜, θ˜) as s increases. x˜ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.96, 0.01],
θ˜ = [0.002, 0.003, 0.005, 0.98] and F (x˜, θ˜) = 380. The
θ˜ becomes more skewed towards topic 4 because (1) user
intrinsic interest aligns towards topic 4, (2) the highest paying
website 4 covers topic 4 with high frequency, and (3) the
influence model is type-B, where user interest increases for
repeatedly shown topics. This in turn leads to increase in the
net revenue.
We next see the effect of relative timescales of influence
on the type-B model in Fig. 3. Here, the dark line indicates
the timescales a(s) = 0.11+s , b(s) =
0.5
1+s0.6 and dotted
line indicates the timescales a(s) = 0.11+s0.6 , b(s) =
0.5
1+s .
In both these cases, the steady state value of x(s) =
[0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.96, 0.01]. This is due to website 4 of-
fer the highest payoff and type-B influence model. It is
interesting to observe the effect of timescales on θ(s) and
F (x(s), θ(s)). When b(s)
a(s) →∞ as s→∞, the user interest
θ(s) skews further towards topic 4 (exceeding 0.9 in 50
sessions). When
b(s)
a(s) → 0, as s → ∞, the user interest
θ(s) is skewed towards topic 4 and is less 0.9. Thus when
user interest adapts faster than recommendation startegy, i.e.,
b(s)
a(s) →∞, it has a positive impact and leads to increase in
net revenue compared to when
b(s)
a(s) → 0.
The preceding are just samples of how, the influence
model, user intrinsic interest, influence factor, the publish-
ing matrix, the relative timescales between recommenda-
tion learning rate a(s), and influence rate b(s) affect the
determination of steady state values of x(s), θ(s) and the
net revenue. Additional numerical results are available in
Appendix.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we used a learning algorithm developed
for a class of recommendation systems motivated by the
Stumbleupon website and adapted it to the case when
the RS receives a website-dependent reward for accepted
recommendations. A key novelty of our work is that we also
consider the case where the user interests are not ‘rigid’, but
are themselves influenced by the recommendations made by
the system.
Clearly, this is just a scratching of the surface. Extensive
numerical investigation will help explain the phenomena
better. It would also be good to develop such influence
models for other online learning algorithms. While we would
like some empirical validation of the models, we believe that
would require design of suitable experiments which would
be a separate line of inquiry.
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APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Eqn. 3
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
∞∑
l=1
clρn(1− ρn)
(l−1).
We can write cl =
∑l
k=1 ∆cl = (cl−cl−1)+ · · ·+(c1−c0),
and c0 = 0. Hence
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
∞∑
l=1
(
l∑
k=1
∆ck
)
ρn(1− ρn)
(l−1).
We interchange summations and after some simplification
we obtain
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
∞∑
k=1
∆ck
∞∑
l=k
ρn(1− ρn)
(l−1)
After separating summations, we have
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
[
∞∑
k=1
∆ck(1− ρn)
(k−1)
∞∑
l=0
ρn(1− ρn)
l
]
=
N∑
n=1
θn
[
∞∑
k=1
∆ck(1− ρn)
(k−1)
]

B. Proof of Lemma 1
Using the definition of ∆cl from (4), we can rewrite first
term of C(x) as follows.
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
(
∞∑
l=1
∆cl (1− ρn)
l−1
)
. (13)
From our assumption that cl is convex increasing, ∆cl ≥ 0
and is non decreasing in l for all l ≥ 1. Further, for a fixed
l > 1, (1−ρn)
l−1 is a convex function of ρn for ρn ∈ [0, 1]
and for l = 1 it is a constant. Thus
∑∞
l=1 ∆cl (1− ρn)
l−1
is also convex function of ρn for ρn ∈ (0, 1]. Note that
ρn > 0. Since the RHS of Eqn. (13) is convex combination
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Fig. 2. In plot (a), we plot the xm(s) as a function of s for m = 4, 5. θn(s) for n = 1, 2, 4 is shown in plot (b). In plot (c), we illustrates the objective
function F as function of s. Here, we use influence type-B model.
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Fig. 3. In plot (a), we describe x4(s) as function of session s. We illustrate θ4(s) verses session s in plot (b). Plot (c) illustrates the objective function
F as function of s. We use influence type-B model. Here, we see the effect of relative timescales between x(s) and θ(s).
of convex functions of ρn, it is also a convex in ρn. Finally,
from the definition of ρn in (1), we see that ρn is linear
transformation of x which in turn means that first term of
C(x), being a composition of convex function with a linear
function transformation is also convex [?, Prop. 1.14]. This
completes the proof. 
C. Derivation of Eqn. (5)
We first derive
∂R(x)
∂xm
. We rearrange R(x) in the following
way.
R(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
hn(x)
ρn(x)
hn(x) =
M∑
m=1
rmxmpm,n
ρn(x) =
M∑
k=1
xmpm,n.
We now take partial derivative of R(x) w.r.t. xm and obtain
∂R(x)
∂xm
=
N∑
n=1
θn
[
1
ρn(x)
∂hn(x)
∂xm
−
hn(x)
(ρn(x))2
∂ρn(x)
∂xm
]
=
N∑
n=1
θn
[
rmpm,n
ρn(x)
− pm,n
∑M
k=1 xkrkpk,n
(ρn(x))
2
]
=
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
ρn(x)
[
rm −
1
ρn(x)
M∑
k=1
xkrkpk,m
]
.
We next derive
∂C(x)
∂xm
. Recall that C(x) can be written as
follows.
C(x) =
N∑
n=1
θn
[
∞∑
k=1
∆ck(1− ρn)
(k−1)
]
.
Taking partial derivative of C(x) w.r.t. xm, we have
∂C(x)
∂xm
=
N∑
n=1
θn
[
−
∞∑
k=1
(k − 1)(1− ρn)
(k−2)pm,n∆ck
]
= −
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
[
∞∑
l=0
l(1− ρn)
(l−1)∆cl+1
]
.
Second equaility because we substitute k−1 = l. This gives
us required result. 
D. Proof of Lemma 2
Clearly, R(x) abd C(x) are differentiable function of
x. Hence F(x) is differentiable function of x. To prove
Lipschitz property, we use the mean value theorem.
1) From the mean value theorem, we can have
F(x˜)− F(xˆ) = ∇F(x)T (x˜− xˆ),
where, x = ζx˜ + (1 − ζ)xˆ, ζ ∈ [0, 1] for x˜, xˆ ∈ Dǫ.
From Holder’s inequality, we obtain
||F(x˜)− F(xˆ)||1 ≤ ||∇F(x)
T ||∞||x˜− xˆ||1.
By infinity norm property, we have
||∇F(x)||∞ ≤ ||∇R(x)||∞ + ||∇C(x)||∞.
2) We first provide bound on ||∇R(x)||∞. To obtain this
upper bound, we require to provide bound on
∂R(x)
∂xm
.
We rewrite following from Eqn. 5.
∂R(x)
∂xm
=
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
ρn
[
rm −
M∑
k=1
xkpk,n
ρn
rk
]
.
Notice that r, x, θ and P are finite. Since ρn ≥ δ > 0,
1
ρn
is finite for all n. Then we can have |∂R(x)
∂xm
| <
∞. Let |∂R(x)
∂xm
| = L1,m < ∞. Thus ||∇R(x)||∞ =
max1≤m≤M L1,m = L1 This holds for all x ∈ Dǫ.
3) We now give bound on ||∇C(x)||∞. Consider
∂C(x)
∂xm
= −
N∑
n=1
θnpm,n
[
∞∑
l=1
l∆cl+1(1− ρn)
l−1
]
.
Observe that l∆cl+1 is a polynomial function because
cl is a polynomial function. Further, from Eqn. 4, we
can obtain l∆cl+1 ≤ l
(κ+1), where κ <∞. Also note
that (1 − ρn)
l−1 is exponetially decaying in l. Hence∑∞
l=1 l∆cl+1(1 − ρn)
l−1 < ∞. Then we can have
|∂C(x)
∂xm
| <∞. Let |∂C(x)
∂xm
| = L2,m. Thus
||∇C(x)||∞ = max
1≤m≤M
∣∣∣∣∂C(x)∂xm
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
1≤m≤M
L2,m = L2.
This leads to bound on ||∇F (x)||∞. Thus ||∇F (x)||∞ ≤
L1 + L2 = L˜. 
E. Preliminary Results Towards Proving Lemma 3
We here show that E[gm(s)] =
∂F (x(s))
∂xm(s)
. This result will
be used for showing that gm(s) is a noisy version of gradient
of F (x(s)).
Lemma 4: Let gm(s) be as defined in Eqn. (6). Then we
can obtain the following.
E[gm(s)] =
∂F (x(s))
∂xm(s)
,
where
∂F (x(s))
∂xm(s)
=
∂R(x(s))
∂xm(s)
−
∂C(x(s))
∂xm(s)
.
Proof: Let I be the event associated with the user
interest in topic in a session. Let J be the event that the
site is click through in a session. We first obtain conditional
probability of the site m click through given that the user
interest in topic n, it is given by
Pr (J = m | I = n) =
xmpm,n∑M
m=1 xmpm,n
.
Recall that T denoted number of trials that required for click
through happens. Given that the user interest in topic n,
the conditional probability that number of trials are l is as
follows.
Pr (T = l | I = n) = ρn(1 − ρn)
(l−1).
We compute the joint conditional probability of site m is
clicked through in lth trial in a session given that the user
interest is in topic n.
Pr (J = m and T = l | I = n) = (1− ρn)
(l−1)xmpm,n
= ρn(1− ρn)
(l−1)xmpm,n
ρn
.
Hence
Pr (J = m and T = l | I = n) = Pr (J = m | I = n) ×
Pr (T = l | I = n) .
We now ready to compute the expectation of gm(s). This
is given as follows.
E [gm(s)] =
N∑
n=1
θn
L∑
l=1
Pr (J = m and T = l | I = n) gm(s).
(14)
After substituting gm(s) from Eqn. (6) in previous Eqn. (14),
and simplifying expressions, we obtain the desired result.
F. Proof of Lemma 3
1) We here show that E[V (x(s))] = 0. From Eqn. (5),
we can rewrite
∂R(x(s))
∂xm(s)
=
1
xm(s)
N∑
n=1
θn
xm(s)pm,n
ρn
×
[
rm −
M∑
k=1
xk(s)pk,n
ρn(s)
rk
]
,
∂C(x(s))
∂xm(s)
= −
1
xm(s)
N∑
n=1
θn
xm(s)pm,n
ρn
×
(
∞∑
l=1
l∆cl+1ρn(1− ρn(s))
l−1
)
.
From Lemma 4, we have
E[gm(s)] =
∂F (x(s))
∂xm(s)
=
∂R(x(s))
∂xm(s)
−
∂C(x(s))
∂xm(s)
,
and we obtain
E[V (x(s))] = ∇F (x(s)) − E[G(s)] = 0.
Here, E[G(s)] = [E[g1(s)], · · · , E[gM (s)]] .
2) We now want to show that E[||V (x(s))||2] < ∞. We
can write E[||V (x(s))||2] as follows.
E[||V (x(s))||2] =
M∑
m=1
[
E[|gm(s)|
2]− (Egm(s)])
2
]
≤
M∑
m=1
E[|gm(s)|
2].
This suggest that we have to prove E[|gm(s)|
2] <∞.
From Eqn. (6), we notice that gm(s) is addition of two
term, and we use inequality (A+B)2 ≤ 2(A2 +B2).
Let
A :=
1
xm(s)
[
rm −
1
ρn(s)
M∑
k=1
rkxk(s)pk,n
]
B :=
T (s)∆cT (s)+1
xm(s)
.
We now write E[A2] as follows.
E[A2] =
N∑
n=1
θn
∞∑
l=1
ρn(s)(1− ρn(s))
(l−1) xm(s)pm,n
ρn(s)
×
(
1
xm(s)
[
rm −
1
ρn(s)
M∑
k=1
rkxk(s)pk,n
])2
.
Rearranging terms, we get
E[A2] =
N∑
n=1
θn
xm(s)pm,n
ρn(s)
×
(
1
xm(s)
[
rm −
1
ρn(s)
M∑
k=1
rkxk(s)pk,n
])2
.
Observe that all terms in the previous expression are
finite, because ρn(s) ≥ δ > 0, xm(s) ≥ ǫ, r, P, and
x(s) are finite. Further it is sum of finite terms. Hence
E[A2] <∞.
We now want to bound E[B2]. We can write
E[B2] =
N∑
n=1
θn
∞∑
l=1
ρn(s)(1 − ρn(s))
(l−1) ×
xm(s)pm,n
ρn
(
l∆cl+1
xm(s)
)2
.
After simplifications, we have
E[B2] =
N∑
n=1
θn
pm,n
ρn(s)
1
xm(s)
∞∑
l=1
(l∆cl+1)
2
×
ρn(s)(1 − ρn(s))
(l−1).
Note that we considered cl = l
κ, this implies that
l∆cl+1 ≤ l
(κ+1) and (l∆cl+1)
2
≤ l2(κ+1). It is
polynomial in κ. (1− ρn(s))
2
decays exponentially in
l. Hence
∞∑
l=1
(l∆cl+1)
2
ρn(s)(1 − ρn(s))
(l−1) <∞, (15)
and E[B2] <∞.
3) Thus from the preceding results, we obtain
E[||V (x(s))||2] < ∞. This completes the proof.

G. Analysis for convergence of x(s) and θ(s)
In the following we sketch the key steps involved in the
analysis. We first analyze scenario when a user adapts on
much slower timescales than the recommendation strategy
of RS, θ(s) changes on a slower timescale than x(s). The
key steps for analysis are the following.
1) We have already assumed that a(s) and b(s) satisfy
∞∑
s=1
a(s) =
∞∑
s=1
b(s) =∞.
Further, to model θ(s) changing on a slower timescale
than x(s), we also assume b(s)
a(s) → 0, s → ∞. In
addition we will also make the following technical
assumption.
∞∑
s=1
a2(s) + b2(s) < ∞.
2) Like in the analysis of the online learning algorithm
in Section III, we have to obtain the suitable limiting
o.d.e. for the iterations of (7) and (12). Since these
iterations are running at different timescales, we com-
pare them to the solution of the singularly perturbed
o.d.e.
x˙(s) =
1
γ
(∇F (x(s), θ(s)) + z) (16)
θ˙(s) = h(x(s), θ(s)). (17)
as γ → 0. h is the expression of limiting o.d.e. for θ.
3) This interacting o.d.e. is analyzed by assuming the
slow component, θ(s), to be quasi-static, i.e. let θ(s) =
θ. This reduces the o.d.e. of the fast component, x(s),
to have θ(s) = θ as a parameter. Then we can analyze
the solution of the latter o.d.e. using the standard
approach. Fixing this solution of x(s), we can then
analyze the o.d.e. for θ(s). We thus have
x˙(s) = ∇F (x(s), θ(s)) + z. (18)
The solution of this o.d.e. is function θ, say, λ(θ). For
small γ, the iterate x(s) closely tracks the solution of
o.d.e. x˙(s), i.e., λ(θ). Hence we can have
θ˙(s) = h(λ(θ(s)), θ(s)). (19)
Then we can show that θ(s) tracks the solution of o.d.e
(19).
The procedure for analysis of the convergence of iter-
ates (7) and (12) is to construct the piecewise linear and
continuous interpolated processes. By assuming θ(s)
to be quasi-static, we can show that this continuous
interpolation of (7) converges to the solution of the
o.d.e (18), i.e. to λ(θ). Fixing λ(θ), we can then show
that the continuous interpolated process of iteration
(12) tracks the solution of o.d.e. (19) and converges
to θ∗, the solution.
It can be shown that (x(s), θ(s)) → (λ(θ∗), θ∗)
almost surely. This result is shown in [12, Chapter 6,
Theorem 2].
Remark 2: 1) We do not have close form expression
for h(x, θ) but we believe that this can be obtained.
2) When θ(s) changes on a faster timescale than the
recommendation strategy x(s), then the analysis is
identical to what we described above except that θ(s)
and x(s) get interchanged.
3) When the θ(s) and x(s) change at the same rate, we
assume a(s) = b(s), and the convergence analysis of
algorithm for x(s) and θ(s) boils down to a single
timescale stochastic approximation algorithm which is
similar to the analysis of the previous section. This is
summarised below. First observe that the iterations will
become[
x(s+ 1)
θ(s+ 1)
]
= ΠD
[[
x(s)
θ(s)
]
+ a(s)
[
G(s)
w(s)− θ(s)
]]
. (20)
Here, Π is Euclidean projection and D is suitably
defined constraint set. Let
y(s+ 1) =
[
x(s + 1)
θ(s+ 1).
]
Then we can define constraint set as follows.
D :=
{
y : y := [y1, · · · , yM+N ],
M∑
i=1
yi = 1, yi ≥ ǫ > 0,
1 ≤ i ≤M,
N∑
j=1
yM+j = 1, yj ≥ 0,M + 1 ≤ j ≤M +N
}
.
Again using similar procedure in Section III, we can
show that the iterations of (20) converge to the solution
of the following limiting o.d.e.
y˙(s) = Φ(y(s)) + z,
where
Φ(y(s)) =
[
∇F (x(s), θ(s))
h(x(s)), θ(s))
]
.
H. Static optimization: Additional numerical examples
1) Example 3: We consider the example with the highest
paying website covers topics that match the user interest.
We use r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and user interest θ =
[0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6]. The optimal recommendation strategy
is x∗ = [0.01, 0.01, 0.22, 0.66, 0.1] and corresponding net
revenue is F (x∗) = 253.2. The x∗ recommends websites
{3, 4, 5} most frequently compare to other sites. The site 4
is the most frequently recommended among all sites because
(1) it covers topics that match user interests, and (2) it has
the highest payoff.
2) Example 4: We now consider the example, where the
highest paying website cover topics that do not match the
user interest. We use r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and user
interest θ = [0.9, 0.05, 0.02, 0.03]. The optimal recommen-
dation strategy x∗ = [0.32, 0.01, 0.01, 0.29, 0.37] and corre-
sponding net revenue F (x∗) = 94 is derived. The optimal
net revenue F (x∗) is less than preceding example. The x∗
recommends websites {1, 4, 5} most frequently compare to
other sites. Observe that the site 5 is the most frequently
recommended site among all site because it covers topics
that match user interests, even though there is the least payoff
from website 5.
I. Online learning: Additional numerical examples
In Fig. 4, we consider the example with user having
different interest for different topics and different payoff from
websites. The user interest is skewed towards topic 4 and
reward structure is also skewed for website 4. We use r =
[150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9]. We
now observe from Fig. 4 that the recommendation strategy
x(s) converges to x∗, i.e., x∗3 → 0.25, x4(s) → 0.72 and
x5(s) → 0.01, and other xm(s) → x
∗
m. See Table I, in
that 3rd row is optimal x∗ and x(s) → x∗ as s → ∞. The
convergence of x(s) to one of the optimal x∗ is determined
by the stepsizes a(s). The optimal net revenue F (x(s)) →
F (x∗). We also see that the error function is decreasing.
In Fig. 5, we describe the convergence of learning algo-
rithm x(s) for example-3 in Section H, where user interest is
skewed towards topic 4 than other topics. The highest paying
website 4 cover the topic that match the user interests. Once
again we observe that x3(s) → 0.08, x4(s) → 0.65, and
x5(s)→ 0.25. The error function ||x(s)−x
∗|| is decreasing
with increase of s.
We now illustrate the convergence of learning algorithm
x(s) for example-4 in Section H, where user interest is
skewed towards topic 1 than other topics and the highest
paying website 4 do not cover the topic that match the
user interests. Once again we observe that x1(s) → 0.32,
x4(s)→ 0.29, and x5(s)→ 0.37. The error function ||x(s)−
x∗|| is decreasing with increase of s. This demonstrate the
convergence of our learning algorithm.
J. Influencing user interests: Additional numerical examples
In Fig. 7 and 8, we consider that the x(s) is up-
dated at fast timescales and θ(s) is updated at slow
timescales. We use a(s) = 0.001(1+s) , and b(s) =
0.9
(1+s1.4) .
Other parameters are as follows. The reward from web-
sites r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100], the initial user interests
θ(1) = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25], initial recommendation strat-
egy x(1) = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2], a user characteristics for
topics ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6], and β = [3, 3, 3, 3].
We illustrate a numerical example for the type-A influence
model in Fig. 7,and we obtain x(s) → xˆ, θ(s) → θˆ,
and F (x(s), θ(s)) → F (xˆ, θˆ) as s increases. Here, xˆ =
[0.03, 0.01, 0.31, 0.48, 0.17], θˆ = [0.14, 0.09, 0.3, 0.47], and
F (xˆ, θˆ) = 200. Since θ(s) has very slow learning rate, it
quickly converges to θˆ.
In Fig. 8, we have numerical example for the type-B
influence model and we obtain x(s) → x˜, θ(s) → θ˜,
and F (x(s), θ(s)) → F (x˜, θ˜) as s increases. Here, x˜ =
[0.03, 0.01, 0.3, 0.45, 0.2], θ˜ = [0.1, 0.07, 0.21, 0.62], and
F (x˜, θ˜) = 247. Here also, θ(s) converges quickly to θ˜.
From Fig. 7 and 8, we observe that user interests in steady
state is different for both type-A and type-B model and
it is more skewed for the type-B model. Hence the type-
B influence model has higher net revenue in steady state
compare to that of the type-A model.
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Fig. 4. Plot (a) illustrates the recommendation strategy xm(s) for website m verses session s. Plot (b) describes the objective function F verses session
s. In plot (c), we describe the error function ||x(s) − x∗|| as function of s. It is illustrated for a user that has different interest for different topics,
has highest interests in topic 4 and reward structure from website is also skewed towards website 4. Here, we used r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and
θ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.02, 0.9].
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Fig. 5. Plot (a) illustrates the recommendation strategy xm(s) for website m verses session s. Plot (b) describes the objective function F verses session
s. In plot (c), we describe the error function ||x(s) − x∗|| as function of s. It is illustrated for a user that has different interest for different topics,
has highest intersts in topic 4 and reward structure from website is also skewed towards website 4. Here, we used r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and
θ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
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Fig. 6. Plot (a) illustrates the recommendation strategy xm(s) for website m verses session s. Plot (b) describes the objective function F verses session
s. In plot (c), we describe the error function ||x(s) − x∗|| as function of s. It is illustrated for a user that has skewed interest for topics and reward
structure from website is also skewed. But high payoff website do not cover topics that matches the user interest. We used r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100]
and θ = [0.9, 0.05, 0.02, 0.03].
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Fig. 7. In plot (a), we describe xm(s) as function of session s. We illustrate θn(s) verses session s in plot (b). Plot (c) illustrates the objective
function F as function of s. We use type-A influence model. The x(s) is updated with fast timescales and θ(s) is updated with slow timescales. Here,
r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
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Fig. 8. In plot (a), we describe xm(s) as function of session s. We illustrate θn(s) verses session s in plot (b). Plot (c) illustrates the objective function F
as function of s. We use type-B influence model. The x(s) is with fast timescales and θ(s) is with slow time scales. Here, r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100]
and ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
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Fig. 9. In plot (a), we describe xm(s) as function of session s. We illustrate θn(s) verses session s in plot (b). Plot (c) illustrates the objective
function F as function of s. We use type-A influence model. The x(s) is updated with slow timescales and θ(s) is updated with fast timescales. Here,
r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100] and ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
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Fig. 10. In plot (a), we describe xm(s) as function of session s. We illustrate θn(s) verses session s in plot (b). Plot (c) illustrates the objective function
F as function of s. We use type-B influence model. The x(s) is with slow timescales and θ(s) is with fast timescales. Here, r = [150, 125, 150, 400, 100]
and ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
We next consider the examples where x(s) is adapted at
slower timescales and θ(s) is adapted at faster timescales
for both type-A and type-B model. This is illustrated in
Fig. 9 and 10. Here, a(s) = 0.0011+s , b(s) =
0.9
1+s0.8 . r =
[150, 125, 150, 400, 100], and ξ = [0.1, 0.05, 0.25, 0.6].
We also notice from Fig. 8 and 10 that for the type-
B model, the fast timescale adaptation of θ(s) yields the
higher net revenue compare to slow timescale adaptation of
θ(s). This is because the steady state value of user interest is
higher for topic 4 in fast timescale model compared to slow
timescale model. The topic 4 is covered by website 4.
But for the type-A model, the relative change of timescales
in θ(s) and x(s) do not provide any gain in steady state value
of the net revenue. This can be observed from Fig. 7 and 9.
